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Abstract 
 
There is a lack of writing on the issue of the education rights of people with 
disabilities by authors of any theoretical persuasion. While the deficiency of theory 
may be explained by a variety of historical, philosophical and practical 
considerations, it is a deficiency which must be addressed.  Otherwise, any statement 
of rights rings out as hollow rhetoric unsupported by sound reason and moral 
rectitude. This paper attempts to address this deficiency in education rights theory by 
postulating a communitarian theory of the education rights of people with disabilities.  
The theory is developed from communitarian writings on the role of education in 
democratic society. The communitarian school, like the community within which it 
nests, is inclusive.  Schools both reflect and model the shape of communitarian society 
and have primary responsibility for teaching the knowledge and virtues which will 
allow citizens to belong to and function within society. Communitarians emphasise 
responsibilities, however, as the corollary of rights and require the individual good to 
yield to community good when the hard cases arise. The article not only explains the 
basis of the right to an inclusive education, therefore, but also engages with the 
difficult issue of when such a right may not be enforceable. 
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Introduction: Articulating a Theory of the Right to Inclusion 
 
There is widespread acknowledgment by policy and law makers that students with 
disabilities have a right1 to an inclusive education—an education in a mainstream, 
non-segregated class room.2 Indeed, at the time of writing, there are 147 signatories to 
the United Nations International Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, which came into force in May 2008.3 Under that convention, nations 
must ‘ensure an inclusive education system at all levels’ (Art. 21(1)). Under that 
convention, the education rights of persons with disabilities encompass a right to ‘not 
[be] excluded from the general education system on the basis of disability’ (Art. 
21(2)(a)) and access to ‘an inclusive, quality and free primary education and 
secondary education on an equal basis with others in the communities in which they 
live’ (Art. 21(2)(b)).4 
Although there is international recognition of the right to an inclusive education, 
there remains very little clearly developed and articulated theory available to underpin 
that right. Rizvi and Lingard (1996, p. 23), after claiming that the field of ‘special 
education’ is ‘largely devoid of any discussion of the moral premises upon which it is 
based’, attempted to fill the vacuum. It could be argued, however, that they have 
merely shopped from a variety of theories in order to postulate what is needed in 
disability theory, resulting in a melange of sometimes incompatible ideals: ‘What is 
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required now is a “complex equality” construction with a strong recognition of 
cultural rights within a broad redistributive framework’ (ibid., p. 25). Thus, Rizvi and 
Lingard have combined the ‘best’ of communitarianism, cultural recognition theory 
and liberalism. 
Christensen (1996, p. 70) has asserted that a right to inclusion is best understood 
in terms of a Rawlsian redistribution of social goods: social justice requires the ‘equal 
distribution of primary social goods … unless unequal distribution is to the advantage 
of the less favoured’ (see Rawls, 1971). She also points, however, to deficiencies in 
redistributive approaches, such as that of Rawls, which account for the fact that 
although inclusion is repeatedly promised, it is not always delivered to an extent 
satisfactory to people with disabilities. Christensen (1996, p. 71) claims that 
redistributive approaches which leave intact social structures and attitudes that 
marginalise people with disabilities will not deliver justice to people with disabilities.5  
It is a problem, moreover, of redistributive approaches that they require the ‘labelling’ 
of a person as ‘less favoured’ before they attract a distribution.  In the context of 
disability, where the very meaning of disability is contested (see Oliver & Barnes, 
1998, p. 13; Barton, 1996b, p. 8), such labelling serves, Christensen (1996, p. 72) 
claims, to entrench the stereotyped view of people with disabilities as ‘deficient’. 
Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard and Henry, have implied a similar criticism of 
redistributive approaches. They argue that such approaches fail to acknowledge that a 
simple distribution of goods, expressed in the context of education as, say, equal 
access to schooling for people with disabilities, will not deliver social justice if the 
school culture remains the same.  They argue that for genuine inclusion to be 
delivered, ‘policies must demand cultural and symbolic changes to the ways schools 
are structured’ (Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard & Henry, 1997, p. 68). 
Slee (1999, p. 125), too, has joined the chorus of criticism of Rawls:  ‘this new 
calculus of redistributive justice … fails to confront disablement as an issue of 
cultural politics’.  Chiefly, it does not recognise the ‘cultural disrespect’ shown to 
people with disabilities.  Slee has called for ‘sorry books’ to be made available for 
signing as a step towards reconciliation of people with disabilities with non-disabled 
people (ibid., p. 120). 
Writers such as Christensen, Taylor, Rizvi and Slee are attracted to the ‘politics 
of recognition’, espoused by feminist theorists such as Fraser and Young (see e.g. 
Fraser, 1995; Young, 1990), and which emphasises the sources of injustice and 
oppression as cultural domination, non-recognition and disrespect.  While the calls of 
these writers for the complete destructuring and restructuring of the existing school 
system have been dismissed by some as ‘ideological’ (see e.g. Jenkinson, 1997) and, 
generally, fail to acknowledge the considerable costs, both financial and in terms of 
social disruption, which would accrue to such a project, the controversy which swirls 
around the issue of inclusion suggests that their emphasis on the need for cultural as 
well as economic solutions to the problems of delivering justice to people with 
disabilities is valid. 
This article postulates a communitarian theory of the right to inclusion. It must 
be acknowledged that communitarianism is one of many theoretical frameworks 
which may account for such a right. It is to be hoped that this article encourages other 
authors to explore how the right sits within the boundaries of other theories and 
philosophies.  The development of an academic literature in this problematic area will 
allow for rigorous debate about the moral basis of the right to inclusion and for 
rigorous comparison of the strengths and deficiencies of one account of that right—
such as the communitarian account—with others. 
  
 
 
Barriers to the Development of a Coherent Theory 
 
While the moral basis of the right to inclusion remains unclear, it could be argued that 
policy and law articulating such a right amount to little more than what Barton (1992, 
p. 2) calls ‘romantic visions and idealistic rhetoric’ and what Slee (1999, p. 125) calls 
‘fashionably inclusive discourse’.  This article, in postulating a communitarian theory 
of the educational entitlements of people with disabilities, attempts to go some way 
towards providing a coherent and complete explanation of the moral foundation of the 
right to inclusion.  
Before a communitarian theory of the education rights of people with 
disabilities is postulated, however, it useful, first, to look briefly at historical, political 
and definitional factors which may explain the paucity of theory in this area.  It is 
necessary, secondly, to look at the communitarian theory of education per se so that 
the principles of that theory may then be extrapolated to the more specific area of the 
education of people with disabilities.  
People with disabilities are perhaps the last of the historically oppressed to 
assert a rights agenda (see e.g. Campbell and Oliver, 1996; Clear, 2000).  Before the 
emergence of the ‘politics of disablement’ in the 1980s (Oliver, 1990) the disability 
sector was dominated by charity organisations and disability policy was dominated by 
a charity rather than a rights discourse.  Provision for people with disabilities was 
predicated on the benevolence of society rather than on the rights of individuals 
(Barton, 1996a, 1996b; Oliver, 1990).  The dominance of the ‘medical model’ of 
disability, whereby disability is constructed as an individual problem growing from an 
individual pathology, a problem to be solved via expert diagnosis and treatment, 
reinforced the benevolent charity approach to people with disabilities (Slee, 1999; 
Armstrong and Barton, 1999; Marks, 1999). Under this model, disability is seen as 
confined to the medical/technical arena and excluded from the rights arena. 
Ignorance in the community about disability may also have contributed to a 
delay in the recognition of rights for people with disabilities (Slee, 1999).  
Responsibility for people with disabilities was relegated to ‘experts’ for so long that 
there remains, perhaps, profound ignorance in the general community of the interests 
of people with disabilities. A powerful mythology surrounds disability.  On the one 
hand there is the image of the ‘hero’ triumphing over adversity to succeed in the 
‘normal’ world.  Campbell, herself a person with a disability, ironically, calls this the 
image of the ‘super crip’ (Campbell and Oliver, 1996).  On the other hand, there is the 
image of the victim of a cruel fate who is to be, at best, pitied, or, at worst, feared and 
avoided. Community attitudes are often informed by stereotype and misinformation 
rather than by any objective understanding of the realities of disability (Slee, 2004, p. 
51).  
Another factor which has contributed to the delay in the emergence of the 
‘politics of disablement’ is the diversity of disability.  People with disabilities are not 
a group defined by some common genetic or cultural feature.6 Each variety of 
disability makes its own demands of the person with that disability and of society.  
Further, disability affects a person to differing degrees according both to that person’s 
individual pathology and to that person’s role and place in society.  Each individual’s 
experience of disability is unique. To this extent, it is impossible to articulate ‘norms’ 
of disability, hazardous to generalise about the nature of disabilities, and difficult to 
 4 
 
formulate the appropriate social response to disabilities. Thus, the articulation of 
theory in this area is constrained. 
Finally, it is not possible simply to extrapolate a theory of disability rights from 
theoretical statements made in relation to sex, race or religious rights.  This is because 
the removal of discrimination against people with disabilities imposes ‘costs’ on the 
community which are not imposed in the removal of discrimination against a sex, race 
or religious group. These costs may be financial in that environments and procedures 
and facilities must be modified to accommodate the needs of the people with 
disabilities.  Where a number of people with disabilities, each with different needs, 
are to be accommodated, the number of modifications which must be made is 
multiplied and so too is the cost.  The accommodation of people with disabilities in 
schools, for example, may mean that ramps and lifts must be installed, learning 
materials supplied in Braille or in audio form, learning assistants employed and so on. 
Different teaching strategies tailored to different learning styles and learning 
capabilities may need to be developed and implemented. The inclusion of some 
students with disabilities may impose emotional and even physical costs on other 
members of the school community.  The Australian case Purvis v State of New South 
Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2004) 217 CLR 92 illustrates the fact 
that such costs may be significant.  The complainant in that case was a thirteen-year-
old boy who had been excluded from South Grafton High School as a result of his 
‘problem’ behaviour.  Daniel’s behaviour was caused by and a consequence of brain 
damage sustained during infancy as a result of an infection with encephalitis. Over the 
course of the 1997 school year Daniel was suspended several times and ultimately 
excluded for repeated verbal abuse and violence which included kicking not only 
furniture and school bags but also other children and teaching staff. A majority of the 
High Court of Australia (Australia’s ultimate appeal court) controversially held that 
Daniel’s exclusion did not offend Australian law.  While some may assert that many 
of the problems or costs perceived to be created by the inclusion of people with 
disabilities in ‘mainstream’ schools are exaggerated or attributable to an inflexible 
school system which has not been structured to cater for individual difference (see e.g. 
Christiansen, 1996; Slee, 1999) how legitimate costs are to be accommodated must be 
a consideration in theory development in this area. 
 
 
Communitarian Education 
 
Communitarians regard the school7 as a community within a community.  It is both a 
microcosm of the wider community and a place of transition from the family to the 
wider community.  If school fills the intermediate space between family and society, it 
fills also the intermediate time between infancy and adulthood (Walzer, 1983, p. 198).  
It has the primary responsibility—above family, above neighbourhood, above 
church—for building citizens who are equipped to create a strong, free, democratic 
society.  The school’s responsibility is both explicit and implicit: to teach the practical 
and moral information students need to function as citizens; to model the structure and 
shape of democratic society. 
Communitarians see social reform not as a revolutionary but as an evolutionary 
process.  The education policy and practice they advocate may not bring instant 
improvement but will deliver results as today’s children mature to virtuous adulthood: 
‘The purpose of such actions is to help to develop the next generation as responsible 
  
citizens even if it is too late for some members of the present generation’ (Tam, 1998, 
p. 76). 
 
The Explicit Role of the School 
 
Communitarians repeatedly refer to two kinds of knowledge which must be an 
element of the explicit curriculum of the school.  The first of these is the ‘common 
knowledge’ needed by citizens to belong to and to function effectively within the 
community.  The second is perhaps a subset of the first: the core values of the 
community. 
 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 
Communitarians regard it as right that a community secure its own future by 
introducing new members to the core knowledge which unites and distinguishes that 
community.  Responsibility for determining the scope and content of this core 
knowledge lies, presumably, with the state as the ‘community’ within which all 
smaller communities ‘nest’.  Communitarians, while insisting that core knowledge 
must be identified and passed on from generation to generation, do not spell out in 
specific detail the content of that core knowledge.  It is right, perhaps, that they do 
not, for the details will surely vary from state to state, from region to region, even 
from community to community. Through inculcation of this core knowledge, the state 
not only ‘reproduces’ itself, it also produces citizens who both belong to society, in 
that they share knowledge of its history and adopt its key beliefs, and are equipped to 
participate in and to contribute to community life. 
Walzer insists that ‘simple equality’ demands that all future citizens need an 
education.  Further, students must learn to be ‘citizens first’.  Any differences in the 
treatment of students related to their different destinations in life—worker, manager, 
professional—should be postponed until ‘shared knowledge’ of the information 
‘citizens need to know’ is achieved: ‘Everyone studies the subjects that citizens need 
to know’ (Walzer, 1983, p. 203).  The goal of teachers here is not to provide equal 
chances but to achieve equal results.  Mastery of the subject matter is crucial: 
‘common work’ for a ‘common end’ (ibid., p. 206). 
Galston (1991, p. 243) describes civic education as ‘the formation of individuals 
who can effectively conduct their lives within, and support, their political 
community’.  Civic education cannot be ‘homogeneous and universal’: ‘It is, by 
definition, education within, and on behalf of a particular political order’ (ibid.).  
Galston claims that civic education is based more on rhetoric than on rationality.  The 
aim of such education is the creation of citizens who embrace, perhaps without 
question, core knowledge as ‘valid and binding’ (ibid., p. 244).  According to Galston, 
the responsibility, indeed the right, of the state is to pass on this core knowledge even 
if it is at odds with parental beliefs (ibid., p. 252). 
VALUES EDUCATION 
Values education is an aspect of education for citizenship—shared principles are 
integral to shared citizenship (see ibid., p. 245).  Communitarians, dispelling fear that 
the articulation and inculcation of core values is exclusionary and authoritarian, insist 
that it is both possible to identify values which are common across cultures, which 
prevail ‘beyond all our differences’ (ibid.), and to impart those values without 
infringing essential freedoms. 
Communitarians seem less reluctant to spell out the values that ought to be 
taught than the rest of the content of core knowledge.  The Responsive 
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Communitarian Platform—a document drafted by Etzioni, Galston and Glendon and 
supported by many other prominent communitarians—spells out the ‘values 
Americans share’ and which schools ‘ought to teach’: 
 
… that the dignity of all persons ought to be respected, that tolerance is a 
virtue and discrimination abhorrent, that peaceful resolution of conflicts is 
superior to violence, that generally truth telling is morally superior to 
lying, that democratic government is morally superior to totalitarianism 
and authoritarianism, that we ought to give a day’s work for a day’s pay, 
that saving for one’s own and one’s country’s future is better than 
squandering one’s income and relying on others to attend to one’s future 
needs. (Etzioni, 1993, pp. 258–259) 
 
Supporters of the platform dismiss as ‘farfetched’ the ‘fear that our children will be 
“brainwashed” by a few educators’ (ibid., p 259). 
Tam, writing from a British perspective, distils from a decade of communitarian 
thinking four key values: love and compassion for others, the critical quest for truth, 
the pursuit of fairness and personal fulfilment.  Tam regularly uses the ‘shorthand’ 
terms: love, wisdom, justice and fulfilment (see e.g. Tam, 1998, pp. 15, 59–62, 234–
235).  Tam addresses ‘the myth that the teaching of common values must involve 
authoritative assumptions’ (ibid., p. 66).  He advocates teaching methods which 
involve ‘co-operative inquiry’ into, and the modelling of, principled behaviour as 
superior alternatives to authoritarian ‘chalk and talk’ (ibid.). 
Analysts of communitarian thinking have also attempted to identify and 
enumerate communitarian values.  Frazer (1998, p. 246), for example, compiled a 
useful list of what she claims to be ‘communitarian values’ for an analysis of ‘the 
corpus of “political communitarianism”’: ‘civic spirit, solidarity, equality, democracy, 
voluntary service, social capital, common good, participation, political power, 
cleanliness, responsibility, self-discipline, mutuality’ (ibid., p. 249). 
Supporters of the Communitarian Platform and Tam identify a lack of values in 
education as dangerous (see e.g. Etzioni, 1993, p. 259; Tam, 1998, p. 57). Galston 
(1991, p. 255) reiterates what he claims to be a ‘basic fact of liberal sociology’: ‘the 
greatest threat to children in modern liberal societies is not that they will believe in 
something too deeply, but that they will believe in nothing very deeply at all’.  Values 
education need not be a discrete subject within the school curriculum.  Values can be 
taught and learned across the curriculum; explanation and discussion of values can be 
integrated into every existing subject.  It should not matter, therefore, which subjects 
students are interested in, which subjects they choose to study (Tam, 1998, p. 59). 
Moreover, an absence of overt values education does not mean an absence of values 
education altogether.  No individual, no social institution is morally neutral.  Each 
person, each organisation, each administration reveals a moral code—or lack of it—
through behaviour tolerated, decisions made, actions taken.  
 
Implicit Content of Schooling 
 
Communitarians regard the school culture as imparting important lessons to students.  
These lessons are not studied; rather they are absorbed, simply by ‘being’ at school.  
Etzioni (1993, p. 115), for example, regards the ‘experiences school generates’ as the 
‘single most important factor that affects education’, placing it above both the explicit 
curriculum and teaching strategies.  Experiences, says Etzioni, are ‘more effective 
  
teachers than lectures’ (ibid., p. 103).  Walzer (1983, p. 63) makes a similar claim: 
‘the content of the curriculum is probably less important that the environment in 
which it is taught’.  Schools have the opportunity to model the democratic community 
for students in two ways: first, how a school is managed can model core democratic 
values in action; secondly, the demographic structure of a school can model the 
inclusive nature of democratic society. 
 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT 
Etzioni (1993, p. 105) argues the first step in enhancing the role of the school as a 
‘moral educator’ is to ‘increase the awareness and analysis of the school as a set of 
experiences’.  His implication is that the school culture should not simply evolve, it 
should be deliberately constructed.  While students may learn lessons from school 
management unconsciously, those lessons should be consciously formulated:  
 
Ideally, the teachers and principals of each school should at least once 
every three years engage in an extensive ‘retreat’.  Here they would spend 
a weekend, in some secluded place, drawing on professional facilitators, 
examine the experiences their school generates.  They would agree to set 
aside cognitive questions about the curriculum … and focus on one 
question: what experiences do we fashion? (ibid., pp. 106–107) 
 
Schools, says Etzioni (ibid., p. 105), are not simply ‘a collection of teachers, pupils, 
classrooms and curricula’.  What happens in the car parks, cafeterias and corridors is 
an equally important ingredient of the education experience. The school must generate 
and implement policies which promote tolerance and maintain fairness and discipline 
in those places as well as in the classroom.8 
The clear implication is that there should be a high degree of conformity 
between the explicit and implicit moral lessons learned at school.  If what happens at 
a school is not consistent with the moral code expressly advanced by that school, then 
the only ‘values’ lessons learned by students will be, first, cynicism and, secondly, 
that there is no coherent moral order which informs the community. 
 
SCHOOL DEMOGRAPHICS 
Democratic society purports to be inclusive.  Communitarians insist that democratic 
schools should, similarly, be inclusive.  The role of the school is not merely to mirror 
the community at large, however.  The school has the opportunity to model inclusive 
policies and practices to the broader community, teaching both students and their 
parents that such policies and practices are essential in a genuine democracy. 
The rationale for inclusion is not only that it is just.  Inclusion enables both the 
experience of collective action and the personal growth necessary to develop as an 
effective citizen:  
 
Inclusive communities enable all members to participate in the collective 
processes affecting their lives … Human beings need to relate to others on 
a substantial basis to develop their experience of love, collaboration in the 
discovery of truths, establish justice and expand their opportunities for 
genuine fulfilment.  Only inclusive communities which respect their 
members as having equal shares of the overall power for determining 
collective action, and welcome their exercise of that power, can ensure that 
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what people need for common life will be sustained in practice. (Tam, 
1998, p. 8) 
 
Tam (ibid.) asserts than an inclusive community would not tolerate schools which 
encouraged or even allowed ‘supremacy’ in access to education based on ‘wealth, 
race, religion, sex, or any form of group allegiance’.  Further, it is vital that citizens 
learn to work together.  As such, ‘differentiation according to a narrow range of 
academic abilities would produce citizens who are ill at ease with co-operating with 
others who possess different skills and abilities’ (ibid.).  Inclusive schooling, 
therefore, is both just and a training for citizenship. 
Walzer (1983, p. 198) stresses the characteristic normative structure of the 
education process, emphasising that ‘education distributes to individuals not only their 
futures but their presents as well’.  If students—in their present—are to belong to and 
be accepted in the community they must be accepted in school as well.  The structure 
of the school is, however, a potent agent for reform of the structure of society.  Walzer 
(ibid, p. 199) refers to Dewey’s notion of the school as a ‘special social environment’ 
protected—to some extent—from external social and economic pressures (see Dewey, 
1977).  The school has the opportunity to organise itself according to principles of 
equality and the power to model equality as a desirable social good. 
The embedding of the school in the neighbourhood is also acknowledged as 
important by Walzer.  In principle ‘neighbourhoods have no admission policies’ 
(Walzer, 1983, p. 224).  Moreover, when a community comes to regard a school as its 
own, ‘its existence may serve to heighten feelings of community’ (ibid.).  Walzer 
(ibid., p. 225) draws the following conclusion: ‘The democratic school, then, should 
be an enclosure within a neighbourhood, a special environment within a known world 
where children are brought together as students exactly as they will one day come 
together as citizens’. 
 
 
The Theoretical Basis of the Right of People with Disabilities to an Inclusive 
Education 
 
While communitarian writers have published little work explicitly on inclusive 
education for people with disabilities it is possible to extrapolate a theory from their 
general theory of education combined with their comments directly on point.  It is 
clear that communitarianism offers the best features of both liberal and feminist 
theory in relation to treatment of people with disabilities.  It acknowledges both that a 
redistribution of goods is necessary to people with disabilities and that such ‘simple 
equality’ alone cannot deliver justice (see Walzer, 1983).  Further, in their emphasis 
on democracy as inclusive, communitarians recognise the entitlement to respect as 
citizens and the right to self-determination of people with disabilities which are also at 
the heart of the ‘politics of recognition’.  Communitarianism offers a solution to 
another problem with the Rawlsian version of liberalism.  The fundamental Rawlsian 
ideal of ‘fair equality of opportunity’ fails to account for the right to their share of 
social goods for some people with disabilities.  Howe (1996, p. 60), speaking in the 
context of education, explains that some students ‘by the nature and severity of their 
disabilities … are precluded from enjoying equality of educational opportunity’ and 
argues that some other ‘rationale’ must be advanced for educating such students.  
Communitarianism offers such a rationale via emphasis on education not so much as 
an instrument of opportunity as of inclusion.  The fundamental purpose of education 
  
is not to provide opportunities to students but to provide the information students need 
to belong to and to participate in the community. 
 
The Right to Inclusion in Society 
 
The starting point is that, although communitarians are suspicious of ‘rights talk’ and 
regard the creation of new rights as an excess of liberalism and expensive to the 
community (see e.g. Glendon, 1991; Etzioni, 1993), it is clear that inclusion in society 
is a right for all citizens.  Tam (1998, p. 8) puts this bluntly: ‘democratic society is 
inclusive’.  While most communitarian writing on inclusion relates to themes of sex, 
race and religious discrimination, there are some statements which extend the right to 
inclusion explicitly to people with disabilities.  Tam (ibid., p. 137) , demonstrating 
some sensitivity to the ‘politics of disablement’, says that citizens vulnerable to 
discrimination because of disability ‘should have confidence that society as a whole is 
on their side, and should not be made to feel isolated as troublemakers who refuse to 
accept their lot’.  It is the role of the community not merely to care for people with 
disabilities, but to empower them to play an active part in the determination of their 
futures and to preserve their dignity and responsibility (ibid., p. 134).  Their 
membership of the community presupposes both their recognition as citizens and their 
entitlement to inclusion and support.  Hauerwas (1998, p. 151) stresses the 
interdependence of community and the need for correlation between beliefs and 
actions.  He observes that people without disabilities learn and grow from their 
interactions with people with disabilities, highlighting one way that people with 
disabilities can demonstrate ‘mutual obligation’, can give back to the community. 
Of the communitarian theorists, MacIntyre (1999) has produced the most 
comprehensive analysis of the ‘place’ of a person with a disability within the 
community.  MacIntyre’s rhetoric focuses more on recognition and respect than on 
rights and obligations, importing, perhaps, some of the cultural recognition theory of 
writers like Fraser and Young into communitarian theory.  He implies that respect 
from others and self-respect are important aspects of this place.  Recognition from the 
community is fundamental to this respect and self-respect.  Fundamental to 
community recognition is the understanding that ‘each member of the community is 
someone from whom we may learn and may have to learn about our common good 
and our own good, and who always may have lessons to teach us about those goods 
that we will not be able to learn elsewhere’ (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 135).  Unlike many 
writers about disability, MacIntyre confronts the issue that some forms of disability 
will limit the opportunities of those ‘afflicted’.  He speaks of those ‘whose extreme 
disablement is such that they can never be more than passive members of the 
community, not recognising, not speaking or not speaking intelligibly, suffering but 
not acting’ (ibid., pp. 127-8).  However, like Hauerwas, MacIntyre emphasises that 
even those members of the community who cannot actively participate in community 
life, have the important—if passive—role of providing others with the opportunity to 
learn through caring and giving.  MacIntyre emphasises, further, that as teachers of 
the vital virtue of ‘just generosity’, people with disabilities are entitled to ‘political 
recognition’ in the form of respect from the community (ibid., p. 140). 
 
The Right to Inclusion in the Neighbourhood School 
 
As the school is both a microcosm of and the model for the wider community it 
follows, then, that the communitarian school is inclusive.  Walzer (1983, p. 222) has 
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emphasised the relationship between school and neighbourhood.  It is important that 
all children have access to their neighbourhood schools.  Further, while it is 
impossible and probably pointless to insist that a school’s student body reproduce a 
pattern which exactly replicates a democratic social pattern, it is ‘crucial’ that schools 
‘aim at a pattern of association anticipating that of adult men and women in a 
democracy’ (ibid., p. 217).  Walzer (ibid., p. 221) elaborates: ‘one could not 
conceivably organise a democratic society without bringing together people of every 
degree and kind of talent and lack of talent’. 
Yet, communitarians clearly recognise that access to school does not necessarily 
equate with inclusion.  Walzer (ibid., p. 202) sees equality of access to education as 
delivering ‘simple equality’ to students, but he is quick to point out that ‘simple 
equality’ is soon lost—for no educational system can ever be the ‘same for all’.  
Equal access to school does not guarantee equal treatment or opportunity at 
school.  Communitarians acknowledge that the school culture, and not only its 
enrolment policies, must be inclusive.  The school is the training ground for 
citizenship—students learn both from the explicit curriculum and from the implicit 
curriculum, the school culture—the information they need to function as citizens. This 
information includes the virtue of not only tolerance but also respect for diversity 
(Etzioni, 1993, pp. 258-9).  Tolerance and respect for diversity must be apparent not 
only in the lessons taught in the classroom but also in the demographics and 
governance of the school.  Reform of school culture is necessary for genuine inclusion 
to occur.  Communitarians regard reform as an evolving process: while benefits may 
not be delivered to the present generation of learners, incremental cultural changes 
can deliver benefits to future generations (Tam, 1998, p. 76). 
Communitarians emphasise the interdependence of community: self is 
constructed not only from individual traits but also from membership of the 
community.  This is the main reason, perhaps, that inclusion is of such importance to 
communitarians—if a person is excluded from society, he or she is excluded from the 
opportunity not only of complete citizenship but also of complete development as a 
person.  The community provides both emotionally and physically for each citizen but 
does so on the basis of mutual obligation and, as such, each citizen must be 
‘responsive’, must give to the community to balance what they take.   Slee’s (1999, p. 
128) cogent criticism of contemporary society is that people with disabilities trade in a 
currency which is not recognised as valuable.  That is, people with disabilities are 
commonly regarded as having little or nothing to contribute to the community.  For 
communitarians, one purpose of inclusive education is for the various members of a 
community to learn from and through our relationships with others (see e.g. 
Hauerwas, 1998, p. 149; MacIntyre, 1999). 
 
 
Limits on the Right to an Inclusive Education 
 
Whilst inclusion is a fundamental tenet of communitarianism, communitarian theory 
does imply some limits to the right to an inclusive education.  Communitarians 
dispute the argument that considerations of the public good necessarily entail a 
‘sacrifice of rights’ by individuals and argue that both may occupy the same ‘turf’ 
(Etzioni, 2004, p. 96) but it is nevertheless a corollary of the principles of mutual 
obligation and of community interdependence that when the ‘hard cases’ arise, that is, 
when problems of competing rights and obligations arise, these problems are likely 
resolved in the manner which will benefit the wider community rather than the 
  
individual.  The Responsive Community Platform rationalises this preference on the 
basis that individual rights and freedoms are best protected in a strong community: 
‘neither human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained for long outside the 
interdependent and overlapping communities to which we all belong … The exclusive 
pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social environments on which we all 
depend and is destructive to our shared experiment in democratic self-government’ 
(Etzioni, 1993, p. 258).  It can be extrapolated from this preference for community 
welfare over individual ‘rights’ that when problems of competing rights and 
obligations arise in respect of the inclusion of people with disabilities in mainstream 
schools, the right to inclusion must in some circumstances be surrendered for the good 
of the community.  Competing rights and obligations are most acutely apparent in the 
case of the inclusion of students with intellectual and neurological disabilities in 
mainstream schools where the disability causes behaviour which compromises the 
quality and the safety of the learning environment for other students and the working 
environment for staff. 
Walzer (1983, p. 214) cautions that when it comes to the ‘difficult’ distributive 
problem of deciding who goes to which school and with whom, it must be 
remembered that ‘it isn’t only [school] places that are distributed to children; children 
themselves are distributed among the available places’.  Not all children can study 
together in the one class or even at the one school.  Different decisions, ‘political’ 
decisions, must be made allocating students to places. 
While communitarians tend to focus on education as socialisation for 
citizenship, others, particularly employers and even parents and students themselves, 
focus on education as preparation for the workplace, as a means of sorting students 
into boxes for life.  MacIntyre (1987, p. 17) identifies one of the major roles of 
modern education systems as ‘to fit the young person for some particular role and 
occupation in the social system’.  What happens, however, when the ‘socialisation’ 
and the ‘sorting’ roles of education clash?  What happens if, before a child’s 
‘socialisation as a citizen’ is complete, that child’s intellectual ability—or disability—
determines the time has come for him or her to be ‘sorted’ into a ‘special’ school or 
out of school altogether?  What happens when the inclusion of some hinders the 
development of others? Communitarian writers, particularly Tam and Walzer, reveal 
some sensitivity to the moral and social difficulties raised in attempting to answer 
such questions. 
Tam and Walzer do contemplate that some form of ‘streaming’ may be 
necessary to accommodate the different abilities of students.  Streaming, says Tam 
(1998, p. 68), has ‘the advantage of developing pupils with diverse potentials’.  
Walzer (1983, p. 221) admits ‘there are educational reasons for separating out 
children who are having special difficulties with mathematics, for example’.  The best 
inference to be drawn from their ‘streaming’ comments is that it should result in the 
accommodation of some students in separate classes at their neighbourhood school 
rather than in their relocation to a different school altogether.  This inference is 
supported by the fact that both Tam and Walzer are adamant that a policy of total 
segregation of students with learning difficulties is not only undemocratic, it is 
counterproductive for the community.  Tam (1998, p. 68) cautions that ‘total 
segregation could mean that a culture of co-operative citizenship could be seriously 
undermined’.  Walzer (1983, p. 221) argues that segregated schools could reinforce 
inequality in the wider community: 
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… there are neither educational nor social reasons for making such 
distinctions across the board, creating a two-class system within the 
schools, or creating radically different sorts of schools for different 
students When this is done, and especially when it is done early in the 
education process, it is not the association of citizens that is being 
anticipated but the class system in roughly its present form. 
 
Tam is wary of parents who, wanting the ‘best’ for their own children, selfishly insist 
on segregating from the mainstream those students whose needs are perceived as 
interfering with the academic progress of their peers.  The ‘best’ course for some 
individuals may have as its corollary the ‘worst’ course for other individuals, and for 
the community as a whole: ‘the admission policy of schools must ultimately help to 
meet the needs of the community as a whole and not just some parents who do not care 
about the needs of others’ (Tam, 1998, p. 74).  Walzer (1983, p. 221) wryly points out 
that ‘the adult world is not segregated by intelligence’.  Segregation, Walzer (ibid., p. 
221) reiterates, is practically and politically wrong: ‘in a practical sense we are 
required by our work to mix up and down the status hierarchy; further, democratic 
politics requires that we mix with a wide range of people’. 
As noted earlier, Walzer (ibid., p. 208) also nods to the ‘sorting’ role of 
education by acknowledging that not only are some students better suited to a more 
‘specialised education’, it is also in the community’s interests to provide it to them.  
Such specialised—and potentially exclusive—education, however, must be delayed 
until the foundations of citizenship have been laid for all: ‘citizenship, unlike 
medicine or law, doesn’t require a license; students don’t need a passing grade in 
democratic politics.  But they should definitely take the course’ (Walzer, 2006, p. 
230). 
Walzer (1983, p. 221) also makes one curious comment which suggests a clear 
limit to the right to an inclusive education: ‘Except for a total incapacity to learn, 
there are no reasons for exclusion that have to do with the school as a school’. 
Unfortunately, Walzer does not elaborate on how the ability or inability to learn is to 
be assessed.  Further, Walzer’s comment is somewhat contradictory in light of the 
communitarian insistence that many lessons—often very valuable moral lessons—are 
absorbed not by conscious intellectual effort but by experience. Walzer’s comment 
also fails to account for the strong assertion of such communitarians as Hauerwas and 
MacIntyre that we learn essential life lessons from shared experiences with people 
with disabilities (see e.g. Hauerwas, 1998, pp. 149ff.; MacIntyre, 1999).   It should, 
however, be acknowledged, that Hauerwas and MacIntyre do not explicitly 
contemplate the class room as the context for that learning or the difficulties that 
might attend the meshing of formal instruction and the informal lessons learned 
through interaction with people whose impairments impact on the learning 
environment.  Walzer’s throwaway line suggests, perhaps, that where there is a clash, 
the communitarian ideal of the classroom as model of democratic society yields to the 
communitarian ideal of the classroom as a place of explicit instruction in the skills 
prerequisite to citizenship. It may also imply a controversial default position of 
‘integration’ rather than full inclusion as an appropriate accommodation of those 
students with disabilities whose learning is disruptive to others. 
While Walzer’s ‘total incapacity to learn’ comment is problematic and lacks, 
perhaps, the detail of mature theory. Walzer’s comment does indicate, at the very 
least, a communitarian willingness to confront the hard case of the student with severe 
intellectual or behavioural disability who asserts a right to education at his or her 
  
neighbourhood school—the hard case which continues to challenge legal systems 
worldwide.   
It should be noted at this point that communitarian writers have not directly 
addressed the issue of whether the allocation of extra resources to support the 
inclusion of students with disabilities prefers the good of the individual student to the 
good of the community.  There is no explicit set of guiding principles, therefore, to 
inform an assessment of whether or when community spending to support inclusion of 
people with disabilities threatens to compromise the welfare of the whole community.  
The lack of explicit writing in this area is, no doubt, symptomatic of the general lack 
of writing in disability theory.  Nevertheless, it may be speculated that, as it is a basic 
tenet of communitarianism, the good of the community prevails over the good of the 
individual citizen, and where spending on a minority threatens the good of the 
community as a whole, that spending may be justifiably curtailed.  Whether or when 
‘cost to the community’ arguments should be allowed to justify the exclusion of a 
student with a disability from a mainstream school, and by implication exclusion from 
access to citizenship and participation in community, however, remains unclear. 
 
 
Conclusion: Fundamental Principles of the Communitarian Approach to the 
Education Rights of Students with Disabilities 
 
Several principles underpinning the communitarian approach to education for people 
with disabilities can be postulated from communitarian writings in the area.  First, 
communitarian education is inclusive in the sense that there is a prima facie right for 
any student—regardless of sex, race, culture, religion or ability—to education in a 
mainstream setting.  The fundamental rationale for such inclusion is that 
communitarian society is inclusive and school is both a microcosm of and a model for 
communitarian society.  Further, every student must have access to necessary lessons 
which must be learned before he or she is equipped to function effectively as a citizen. 
The necessary lessons are learned through both the explicit curriculum of the school 
and the implicit curriculum which comprises its environmental and administrative 
culture. 
Secondly, the right to inclusion in the mainstream setting for people with 
disabilities is of particular importance because some necessary lessons are best 
learned alongside those with disabilities.  By providing the opportunity for others to 
learn, students with disability are contributing to the good of the community and, as 
such, entitled to be accorded the respect of the community. 
Thirdly, communitarians acknowledge that there may be a limited place for the 
‘streaming’ of students according to ability where that streaming is appropriate to 
achieve specific desirable education outcomes.  One such appropriate situation may 
arise in relation to the education of students with disabilities.  The ‘streaming’ of 
classes, however, should not justify the exclusion from a mainstream community 
school of students with disabilities.  ‘Streamed’ classes can be provided within a 
mainstream setting to maximise the opportunities for development of an inclusive 
culture. 
Fourthly, it is a basic tenet of communitarian philosophy that in a competition 
between what is good for the community and what is good for the individual citizen, 
community prevails.  Therefore, where the inclusion of a student with a disability in a 
mainstream education setting compromises the ability to learn of the majority of 
students, it may be necessary for the exclusion of that student from the mainstream 
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setting.  Similarly, where the inclusion of a student with an impairment compromises 
the safety of other members of the school community the exclusion of that student 
may be warranted.  While communitarians have not expressly considered, for 
example, the implications of the inclusion of students with problem behaviour for the 
educational opportunities and the safety of others, it is clearly consistent with 
communitarian principles that majority rights should prevail in such a case.  Whether 
the financial cost to the community of supporting students with disabilities in 
mainstream schools, however, is ever sufficient to compromise the general good, and 
thus to justify the exclusion of such students remains unclear. 
Finally, and most controversially, at least one writer, Walzer (1983, p. 221), has 
suggested that the exclusion from a school altogether may be allowable where a 
student, by reason of impairment, demonstrates a ‘total incapacity to learn’. This 
assertion, however, fails to account for the more dominant communitarian view that 
students with a disability have a teaching as well as a learning role.  Thus, there is a 
clear rationale for the inclusion of even those students who lack the capacity to learn 
on the basis that they have the capacity to teach. 
In summary, although communitarians are suspicious of ‘rights’ talk, it may be 
postulated that in a communitarian society a student with a disability has a prima facie 
right to inclusion in a mainstream school.  The communitarian preference for the good 
of the community above the good of the individual, however, means that 
communitarians will concede a ‘thicker’ set of limitations on individual rights and 
freedoms than would be the case under, say, a liberal analysis.  The individual’s right 
to inclusion, therefore, will yield to the extent necessary to protect the rights of others 
in the community.  In this situation the benefit to the community of a learning 
environment which models and promotes inclusion is displaced by a detrimental 
disruption to others in that learning environment.  Complete exclusion from a 
mainstream school, however, is justified only when the inclusion of a student with a 
disability compromises the ability to learn or safety of the other students at the school.  
 
 
Notes  
  
1. Here, and throughout the article, unless otherwise stated, the use of the term ‘right’ is intended 
to imply its generic, ‘dictionary’ meaning as ‘a benefit or claim entitling a person to be treated 
in a particular way’ and is not intended to imply a meaning consistent with any particular 
theoretical framework. For the adopted definition see Butt, 2004, p. 381. 
2. It is acknowledged that inclusion and inclusive education are contested terms.  For the purpose 
of this article they are taken to refer to the situation where a student with a disability is educated 
at his or her local school, in a non-segregated classroom, alongside students without disabilities. 
See, for example, Armstrong & Barton (2007, p. 10), ‘an inclusive education … is based on the 
belief that all children have the right to attend their local school, regardless of difference and 
that schools are part of communities’.  It is acknowledged, too, that while in some countries 
debate swirls about the right to an inclusive education, the anomaly exists that in other 
countries, where respect for human rights is yet to be entrenched, or where government funds 
preclude their delivery, the debate is still properly, if frustratingly, focussed on the right to 
education per se.  
3. It is interesting to note that two large modern democracies, the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom are not signatories. Both these nations have, nevertheless, demonstrated a 
commitment to the delivery of an inclusive education. While there is no constitutional right to 
education in the United States (See San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 
US 1 (1973)), there is specific legislation which provides that students with disabilities are 
entitled to a ‘free and appropriate public education’ in the ‘least restrictive environment’: 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 2004 20 USC § 1400. Similarly, in the UK, since 
2001, there has been a prima facie ‘duty to educate children with special educational needs in 
  
mainstream schools’: see Education Act 1996 (UK) s 316. The Education Act 1996 (UK) was 
amended to create the duty by the Special Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001 (UK) C 
10, s 1. 
4. The article is concerned to postulate a theory of education encompassing the compulsory years 
of education. A consideration of the rights of students with disabilities in the tertiary education 
sphere is beyond the scope of this paper. See also n. 6, below. 
5. It could be argued, however, that to imply criticism of Rawls in this respect is to misunderstand 
and to misrepresent his approach to the redistribution of social goods. Rawls’ two principles of 
justice acknowledge that before any distribution of goods takes place, basic liberties must first 
be guaranteed to each person. The basic liberties include freedoms specified by the liberty and 
integrity of the person.  Further, Rawls held that, within his second principle of justice, fair 
equality of opportunity (including freedom from social discrimination) must also be assured 
before there was any redistribution of social goods (See Rawls, 1993, pp. 4-6, 291-3). 
6. It is increasingly recognised in relation even to issues of sex, race and class that it is essential to 
recognise the diversity of interests within groups typically regarded as homogenous. O’Brien, as 
long ago as 1984 referred to the phenomenon of the ‘commatisation’ of difference—sex, 
comma, race, comma, class, comma—to describe this failure to account for the differences 
within and the intersections between different groups (O’Brien, 1984).    
7. The term ‘school’ is used generically to encompass the range of education institutions involved 
in the compulsory phases of education.  While communitarians have theorised about the role 
and function of tertiary education (see e.g. Bellah et al., 1991; Bellah et al., 1996; Calvert, 
2006), close consideration of the rights of students with disabilities in the tertiary sector is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
8. On the point of what schools may do in a practical sense to model inclusion, it is interesting to 
note the proactive Australian approach towards reducing harassment and marginalisation of 
students with disabilities. The Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) s 8(1) obliges all 
education institutions, public and private, pre to post compulsory sectors,  ‘to develop and 
implement strategies and programs to prevent harassment or victimisation of a student with a 
disability’. Furthermore s 8(2) provides that education institutions ‘must take reasonable steps to 
ensure that its staff and students are informed about … the obligation not to harass or victimise 
students with disabilities … the appropriate action to be taken if harassment or victimisation 
occurs; and … complaint mechanisms available to a student who is harassed or victimised’. 
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